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Disability and Reproductive Justice
Samuel R. Bagenstos*
In the spring of 2019, disability and abortion rights collided at the Supreme Court in
a case involving an Indiana ban on “disability-selective abortions.” In a lengthy concur-
rence in the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas argued that the ban was constitutional
because it “promote[s] a State’s compelling interest in preventing abortion from becoming a
tool of modern-day eugenics.” Just a few months earlier, disability and reproductive rights
issues had intersected in a very different way in the debate over the nomination of Brett
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. Disability rights advocates drew attention to an opin-
ion then-Judge Kavanaugh had written uphelding government decisions to require indi-
viduals with intellectual disabilities to have abortions.
Debate over disability and reproductive rights has typically focused on the issues
raised by Justice Thomas’s opinion. This Article argues that any full assessment of the
intersection between disability and reproductive rights must also address the issues raised
by then-Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion. Disabled people are frequently denied their own
rights to conceive, bear, and parent children. Indeed, the practices that continue to prevent
people with disabilities from having and raising children are in many ways the disability
analogues of the race-based eugenic practices that Justice Thomas himself decried. Consider-
ation of insights drawn from the disability rights movement and the reproductive justice
movement suggests that both Justice Thomas and then-Judge Kavanaugh gave the wrong
answers on the questions before them.
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INTRODUCTION
Since at least the 1960s, public debate over abortion rights has fre-
quently turned to issues of disability. Those who argue for the liberalization
of abortion laws have often been successful by raising the specter of fetal
disability—whether caused by Thalidomide, or rubella, or otherwise.1 Those
who agitate for restricting or banning abortion, by contrast, have often ar-
gued that pro-choice advocates devalue the lives of people with disabilities.2
In the spring of 2019, disability and abortion rights collided at the Su-
preme Court. Indiana had adopted a law “barring the knowing provision of
* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to the
Harvard Law & Policy Review for inviting me to contribute to the symposium on the “Politics
of Pregnancy” and for providing incisive editorial suggestions. Thanks to Leah Litman, Harry
Bagenstos, and (as always) Margo Schlanger for helpful comments.
1 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
425, 437–38 (2006); Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587,
590, 595, 610 (2017).
2 See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 438; Ziegler, supra note 1, at 600, 612.
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sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers.”3 The Sev-
enth Circuit invalidated that law.4 In Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana &
Kentucky,5 the Supreme Court denied certiorari (though it summarily re-
versed the Seventh Circuit’s invalidation of a separate Indiana law regulating
the disposal of fetal remains).6 Justice Thomas concurred in the denial of
certiorari, but he filed a lengthy separate opinion arguing that the ban on
selective abortions was constitutional.7 He argued that “this law and other
laws like it promote a state’s compelling interest in preventing abortion from
becoming a tool of modern-day eugenics.”8 He thus gave rhetorical support
to the efforts of antiabortion activists to create an opposition between disa-
bility rights and reproductive rights.
Justice Thomas argued that birth control and abortion had been under-
stood during the early twentieth century Eugenics Era as tools for preventing
reproduction among a group known as “the unfit.”9 Although he noted that
eugenicists’ understandings of “fitness” had a strong racial and ethnic com-
ponent, Justice Thomas also emphasized the bias against individuals with
disabilities: “A typical list of dysgenic individuals would also include some
combination of the ‘feeble-minded,’ ‘insane,’ ‘criminalistic,’ ‘deformed,’ ‘crip-
pled,’ ‘epileptic,’ ‘inebriate,’ ‘diseased,’ ‘blind,’ ‘deaf,’ and ‘dependent (includ-
ing orphans and paupers).’ ”10 And he argued that eugenics was not merely in
the past, but that today “a growing body of evidence suggests that eugenic
goals are already being realized through abortion.”11 He pointed, in particu-
lar, to extremely high reported rates of abortion for fetuses diagnosed with
Down syndrome.12
Just a few months earlier, disability and reproductive rights issues had
intersected in a very different way in the debate over the nomination of Brett
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. Disability rights advocates drew attention
to an opinion then-Judge Kavanaugh had written in a case in which individ-
3 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1781 (2019) (per
curiam).
4 See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
888 F.3d 300, 310 (7th Cir. 2018).
5 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam).
6 Id. at 1781–82.
7 See id. at 1782 (Thomas, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 1783.
9 Id. at 1784.
10 Id. at 1786 (quoting ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN
EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 139 (2016)).
11 Id. at 1787.
12 See id. at 1790–91 (“In Iceland, the abortion rate for children diagnosed with Down
syndrome in utero approaches 100%. Other European countries have similarly high rates, and
the rate in the United States is approximately two-thirds” (citations omitted)). Critics have
argued that the Iceland 100 percent statistic is misleading, because the denominator is those
parents who chose to undergo prenatal testing and whose fetuses tested positive for Down
syndrome. With a testing rate of eighty to eighty-five percent, many children with Down
syndrome continue to be born in Iceland (though, presumably, many fewer than would be born
in the absence of prenatal testing). See Alex Kasprak, Has Iceland Eliminated Down Syndrome
Through Abortion?, SNOPES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/iceland-
eliminated-syndrome-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/3Y9T-LXP4].
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uals with developmental disabilities challenged a District of Columbia policy
that denied them the right to make decisions about their medical care.13 The
case was Doe ex rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia.14 The D.C. Circuit re-
versed a district court decision enjoining that policy.15 Rejecting the plain-
tiffs’ due process claim, then-Judge Kavanaugh explained that “accepting the
wishes of patients who lack (and have always lacked) the mental capacity to
make medical decisions does not make logical sense and would cause errone-
ous medical decisions—with harmful or even deadly consequences to intel-
lectually disabled persons.”16
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion did not say anything specifically about re-
productive rights. He treated the case entirely as one about the (lack of a)
right of incompetent persons to consent to medical treatment. But the case
itself was very much a reproductive rights case. Two of the three plaintiffs
had been forced to have abortions without their consent; they sued precisely
to challenge the policy that had taken away their power to choose.17 Al-
though Kavanaugh had a reputation as a strong “pro-life” judge,18 here he
voted to uphold government decisions to require individuals with intellectual
disabilities to have abortions. Both disability rights and reproductive rights
advocates sought to rally opposition to Kavanaugh around what they charac-
terized as his denial of self-determination and reproductive choice to dis-
abled people,19 but the issue did not gain the salience of other controversies
surrounding his nomination.
13 The article that first raised the issue was Hannah Leibson & Rebecca Cokley, Kava-
naugh Thinks It’s Okay to Perform Elective Surgery on People Without Their Consent,
TALKPOVERTY (Aug. 8, 2018), https://talkpoverty.org/2018/08/09/kavanaugh-thinks-okay-
perform-elective-surgery-people-without-consent/ [https://perma.cc/893A-XEGP].
14 489 F.3d 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
15 See id. at 384.
16 Id. at 382.
17 See Does I through III v. District of Columbia, 232 F.R.D. 18, 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (“In
1984, allegedly without either consulting with Jane Doe I’s legal representative or obtaining
substituted judgment from a court, District officials gave their consent to have Jane Doe I’s
pregnancy aborted.”), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 489 F.3d 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007); id.
(“Jane Doe III became pregnant in 1978 and, according to plaintiffs, decided to carry the
pregnancy to term. District officials, however, allegedly decided that she should have an abor-
tion and gave their consent for the procedure without consulting with Jane Doe III’s legal
representative and without obtaining substituted judgment from a court.”).
18 See Ed Kilgore, Anti-Abortion Activists Have No Doubts About Kavanaugh, NEW YORK:
INTELLIGENCER (July 20, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/07/anti-abortion-ac-
tivists-are-sure-about-kavanaugh-to-scotus.html?gtm=top [https://perma.cc/C3ZZ-9XPY].
Judge Kavanaugh’s reputation rested in part on his high-profile dissenting opinion in Garza v.
Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018).
19 See Amanda Marcotte, Brett Kavanaugh’s Disturbing Abortion History: He Ruled Against
Women Who Were Forced to Abort, SALON (Aug. 20, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.salon.com/
2018/08/20/brett-kavanaughs-disturbing-abortion-history-he-ruled-against-women-who-en-
dured-forced-abortions/ [https://perma.cc/5ETL-TBLF]; S.E. smith, Brett Kavanaugh’s
‘Forced Abortion’ Decision Is About Far More Than Reproductive Rights, REWIRE.NEWS (Aug.
28, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2018/08/28/brett-kavanaughs-forced-abor-
tion-decision-is-about-far-more-than-reproductive-rights/ [https://perma.cc/LQZ2-2F5Z].
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Debate over disability and reproductive rights has typically focused on
the issues raised by Justice Thomas’s opinion in Box—whether fetal disabil-
ity is an acceptable reason for terminating a pregnancy, and what the law
should do about it. Those are important questions. But any full assessment
of the intersection between disability and reproductive rights must also ad-
dress the issues raised by then-Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion in Doe. Disabled
people are frequently denied their own rights to conceive, bear, and parent
children, whether through forced sterilization or abortion, the denial of as-
sisted reproduction, or the denial of parental rights once their children are
born. Some of these practices—notably forced sterilization—are emblematic
of the Eugenics Era. But they are not confined to the past. Indeed, the
practices that prevent people with disabilities from having and raising chil-
dren—practices like the law Kavanaugh upheld in Doe—are in many ways
the disability analogues of the race-based eugenic practices that Justice
Thomas himself decried in his Box opinion.
When Justice Thomas and others seek to weaponize disability rights
against abortion, they distort or disregard the full history of eugenics. They
thus paint a misleading picture of the disability-based threats to reproductive
rights. And they also, I will argue, misapprehend key aspects of disability
rights ideology.
In this Article, I offer a fuller consideration of the intersection of disa-
bility and reproductive rights. I do so by considering the legal and societal
treatment of fetuses and children with disabilities alongside the legal and
societal treatment of parents with disabilities. And I do so by bringing to
bear insights drawn from two distinct social movements: the disability rights
movement and the reproductive justice movement. These movements have
different constituencies and histories, but I will argue that they offer comple-
mentary insights into these issues. When those insights are considered to-
gether, they suggest that people with disabilities have more to fear from a
regime that denies them reproductive rights than from one in which wo-
men’s reproductive choices are respected. And these insights suggest that we
must focus on the context surrounding the making of reproductive decisions
as much as on formal restrictions on the choices women may make.20
I argue that, taken together, the disability rights and reproductive jus-
tice perspectives offer substantial purchase on the questions raised by Justice
Thomas in his Box concurrence. They suggest, I will argue, that those ques-
tions are serious indeed, but that Thomas gave the wrong answer to them.
20 For earlier suggestions that the disability rights and reproductive justice movements can
be complementary, see Seema Mohapatra, Law in the Time of Zika: Disability Rights and Re-
productive Justice Collide, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 343 (2019); Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha
Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race, Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technol-
ogies, 10 DU BOIS REV. 313, 317 (2013); Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just
Rights, DISSENT, Fall 2015. Mary Ziegler has made a thoughtful and well-supported argument
that a reproductive justice approach can help to reconcile the tensions between disability rights
and pro-choice advocates, though she focuses exclusively on issues involving disabled fetuses
and children. See generally Ziegler, supra note 1. My analysis of those issues overlaps substan-
tially with Ziegler’s, though I also address issues involving potential parents with disabilities.
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These perspectives also suggest that any effort to address the intersection of
disability and reproductive rights needs to address the questions raised by
then-Judge Kavanaugh’s Doe opinion—and that Kavanaugh, too, gave the
wrong answer.
I should note one important caveat: I do not mean to say that the an-
swers I offer are the only ones one we can derive from looking at these ques-
tions through disability rights and reproductive justice lenses. Given the
diversity within these social movements, I am sure that some movement par-
ticipants would disagree with important aspects of my argument.21 But I do
think these lenses offer an important perspective on the problem, and I be-
lieve my argument is consistent with the key principles articulated by activ-
ists in both the disability rights and the reproductive justice movements.
I. THE DISABILITY RIGHTS AND REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE MOVEMENTS
To set the stage for my discussion below, I begin with a brief overview
of the relevant insights I draw from the disability rights and reproductive
justice movements. This overview necessarily proceeds at a high level of ab-
straction, and it passes over a lot that is interesting—but not as relevant for
present purposes—about these movements. Nonetheless, some general con-
sideration of disability rights and reproductive justice is necessary to ground
the arguments I will make below.
The American disability rights movement is large and diverse. As with
any social movement, its ranks include people who take a range of different
positions on questions of goals, strategies, and tactics.22 But there are two
basic principles on which the overwhelming majority of U.S. disability rights
advocates would agree. The first is an opposition to paternalism, and a con-
comitant belief that people with disabilities should make decisions for them-
selves rather than being subject to the choices of nondisabled parents,
professionals, or other do-gooders.23 The second is what has come to be
21 Some participants in the disability rights movement, for example, would agree with
Justice Thomas that states should be permitted to ban disability-selective abortion. See, e.g.,
Marsha Saxton, Why Members of the Disability Community Oppose Prenatal Diagnosis and Selec-
tive Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 147 (Erik Parens & Adrienne
Asch eds., 2000).
22 See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (2009).
23 See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OP-
PRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 3 (1998) (“Control has universal appeal for DRM [disability
rights movement] activists because the needs of people with disabilities and the potential for
meeting these needs are everywhere conditioned by a dependency born of powerlessness, pov-
erty, degradation, and institutionalization. This dependency, saturated with paternalism, be-
gins with the onset of disability and continues until death.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 1011–12
(2003) (“Although there were many differences among these groups [that came together in the
disability rights movement], all sought to make their own decisions concerning their lives, with
all the risks that would entail. All sought freedom from professionals and welfare bureaucracies
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known as the “social model” of disability—the notion that disability is not a
condition that is inherent to the disabled person, but is instead one that
results from the interaction between a person’s physical or mental attributes
and the contingent social decisions that make particular opportunities or en-
vironments incompatible with those attributes.24 “Rather than providing
charity or public assistance—an approach that both stigmatizes its recipients
and leaves the disabling aspects of the environment in place—most disability
rights activists insist that society as a whole has a responsibility to eliminate
the social and physical structures that deny people with ‘disabilities’ access to
opportunities and thereby create ‘disability.’ ”25
The term “reproductive justice” was “conceived in 1994 by feminists of
color to conceptualize reproductive rights struggles embedded in social jus-
tice organizing that simultaneously challenged racism and classism, among
other oppressions.”26 Loretta Ross, one of the key participants in the move-
ment, says that “[t]he Reproductive Justice framework analyzes how the abil-
ity of any woman to determine her own reproductive destiny is linked
directly to the conditions in her community—and these conditions are not
just a matter of individual choice and access.”27
Reproductive justice approaches thus broaden the frame beyond narrow
pro-choice advocacy in two ways. First, they look not just to the moment of
choice but also to the broader social, legal, and institutional structures in
which people make reproductive decisions.28 Second, they focus on aspects of
reproductive freedom that go beyond the question whether to terminate a
pregnancy.29 The reproductive justice framework “includes not only a wo-
man’s right not to have a child, but also the right to have children and to
that paternalistically made decisions for them.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo
Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 795
(2007) (“[P]aternalism has historically been one of the most significant contributors to the
disadvantage people with disabilities experience. Non-disabled parents, teachers, doctors, reha-
bilitation counselors, employers, and others have arrogated to themselves the prerogative to
decide what is best for people with disabilities. In so doing, they have deprived people with
disabilities of opportunities to work and participate in the community. They have denied peo-
ple with disabilities the autonomy that consists in making one’s own choices. And they have
denied people with disabilities the dignity of risk—the opportunity to develop their skills, test
them in the world, and succeed or fail according to their talents.” (footnotes omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
24 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 428–29 (2000).
25 Id. at 430 (footnote omitted).
26 Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 327,
328 (2013).
27 Loretta Ross, What is Reproductive Justice?, in REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING
BOOK: A PRIMER ON REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 4, 4 (2007).
28 See id. (“Moving beyond a demand for privacy and respect for individual decision mak-
ing to include the social supports necessary for our individual decisions to be optimally real-
ized, this framework also includes obligations from our government for protecting women’s
human rights. Our options for making choices have to be safe, affordable and accessible, three
minimal cornerstones of government support for all individual life decisions.”).
29 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 20, at 79 (contrasting the reproductive justice movement
with the “mainstream movement for reproductive rights” in this regard).
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raise them with dignity in safe, healthy, and supportive environments.”30
And it looks comprehensively to the “many kinds of laws [that] shape the
conditions in which women conceive and bear children.”31 In all of these
aspects, reproductive justice advocates employ a self-consciously intersec-
tional analysis that attends to the “political context of intersecting race, gen-
der, and class oppressions.”32 Reproductive justice thus takes the approach
Dorothy Roberts advocated in her book Killing the Black Body:
Reproductive liberty must encompass more than the protection of
an individual woman’s choice to end her pregnancy. It must en-
compass the full range of procreative activities, including the abil-
ity to bear a child, and it must acknowledge that we make
reproductive decisions within a social context, including inequali-
ties of wealth and power. Reproductive freedom is a matter of social
justice, not individual choice.33
Although the disability rights and reproductive justice perspectives are
not identical, they share important affinities. Both perspectives look beyond
individual acts and choices to the social structures in which those acts and
choices take place. Both focus on justice for marginalized or devalued
groups. And just as the disability rights movement organized in response to
harmful systems of paternalism toward people with disabilities—including,
notably, eugenics-inspired policies that sterilized thousands of disabled
Americans—the reproductive justice movement was itself significantly a re-
sponse to the paternalism of those who would force particular reproductive
choices on women of color.34 These overlapping histories and insights pro-
vide the basis for the argument I will make in the rest of this Article.
II. THE BOX QUESTION: BEARING AND RAISING
DISABLED CHILDREN
How might an approach informed by the disability rights and repro-
ductive justice perspectives help us think through the issues raised by the
concurring opinion in Box? Such an approach, I will argue, suggests that
30 Id.; see also Luna & Luker, supra note 26, at 343 (“[R]eproductive justice is equally
about the right to not have children, the right to have children, the right to parent with dig-
nity, and the means to achieve these rights.”).
31 Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—and Why It Matters in
Law and Politics, 93 IND. L.J. 207, 210 (2018).
32 Roberts, supra note 20, at 79. The locus classicus of the concept of intersectionality is
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139. For an excellent recent review of intersectionality scholarship, see Devon W. Carbado et
al., Intersectionality: Mapping the Movements of a Theory, 10 DU BOIS REV. 303 (2013).
33 DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 6 (1997).
34 See generally id. (detailing the history of paternalistic control of African Americans’
reproduction).
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Justice Thomas identified a real problem, but that he endorsed the wrong
solution to it.
First, both perspectives should lead us to take seriously the concerns
Justice Thomas raises in Box. Indeed, disability rights activists have for many
years argued that women are unduly pressured to abort disabled fetuses.
Those activists have done so in terms that resonate strongly with arguments
that reproductive justice adherents have deployed to oppose pressures placed
on the reproductive choices of women of color.
Although it is tempting to think that invoking disability is just an op-
portunistic ploy to justify a rollback of abortion rights,35 the arguments in
Justice Thomas’s opinion resonate strongly with an important line of think-
ing that has emerged from the American disability rights movement. In a
very large fraction of cases, women who find fetal defects in prenatal testing
do decide to have abortions.36 Disability rights activists have argued “that
prenatal testing followed by selective abortion is morally problematic, and
that it is driven by misinformation.”37
They contend that selective abortion is morally problematic because it
“reflects a view that life with a disability is not worth living.”38 And they
argue that if selective abortion succeeds in reducing the number of disabled
people who are born—what some call “the eugenicist’s dream of eliminating
disabilities”39—it will increase disability prejudice by reducing the opportuni-
ties for intergroup contact and diminishing the constituency for rights
protections.40
Disability rights advocates argue that selective abortion is driven by
misinformation because medical professionals provide women with mislead-
ing information and pressure them to choose abortions.41 “Despite the pro-
fessional commitment to non-directiveness in genetic counseling,” the late
Adrienne Asch wrote, “it is clear that many professionals do not practice in a
way that legitimates the choice to maintain a pregnancy of a fetus affected by
a disabling trait.”42 “Too often, disability rights advocates contend, the advice
35 See, e.g., S.E. smith, Disabled People Are Tired of Being a Talking Point in the Abortion
Debate, VOX (May 29, 2019 4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2019/5/29/
18644320/abortion-ban-2019-selective-abortion-ban-disability [https://perma.cc/9KVN-
5DD3] (“Using disablism to sneak past an abortion ban or put abortion advocates in an un-
comfortable position is a brilliant tactic, and one advocates must not fall for.”).
36 See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 438–39. For a suggestion that the estimates of 90 percent
abortion rates, like those offered by Justice Thomas, are likely overblown, see Elizabeth F.
Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1416 n.183.
37 Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing:
Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 3, 13
(Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000).
38 Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 439.
39 Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights, 70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 913, 932 (2002).
40 See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 439.
41 See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 440–41.
42 Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?,
30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 334 (2003).
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pregnant women receive after discovering a fetal disability focuses on (often
unduly) negative predictions about short life expectancies and extensive
medical needs rather than on the ways children with disabilities ‘can partici-
pate in the life of family, school and community.’ ”43 In part, this advice
stems from the negative views health professionals hold about the quality of
life with a disability.44 These disability rights arguments parallel reproductive
justice advocates’ critique of a “privacy” or “choice” framework for abortion
rights. As we have seen, those who take a reproductive justice perspective
find that individualized framework insufficient in part because it fails to ap-
preciate the many constraints beyond state regulation that keep women from
making truly free choices.45
So, the issue raised by Justice Thomas is a serious one. And the connec-
tion he draws with the eugenics movement is one that disability rights activ-
ists themselves have drawn. That connection also resonates in significant
ways with arguments that reproductive justice advocates have made. The
question is whether his proposed solution—banning disability-selective
abortion—is the right one.
Viewing the issue through a reproductive justice lens can help us to
work through the answer to this question. As we have seen, the reproductive
justice approach seeks to widen the frame beyond the moment of choosing
an abortion to look more broadly at the context in which that choice is
made. When we widen the frame in this way, we can see a number of solu-
tions short of banning selective abortion that might address the problem
raised by Justice Thomas.
As Mary Ziegler notes, “parents who might not otherwise choose to
terminate a pregnancy in the case of disability do so because they feel they
have no choice, particularly given the bleak outcomes faced by many disabled
43 Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 440 (quoting Asch, supra note 42, at 335).
44 See Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of
Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia (2000), 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526,
530 (2000) (“[H]ealth professionals significantly underestimate the quality of life of persons
with disabilities compared with the actual assessments made by people with disabilities them-
selves. In fact, the gap between health professionals and people with disabilities in evaluating
life with disability is consistent and stunning.”); Tom Shakespeare et al., Disability and the
Training of Health Professionals, 374 LANCET 1815, 1815 (2009) (“Evidence is mixed on the
impact of education on medical students’ attitudes towards disability. Professional training can
lead to an erosion of empathy and growth in cynicism. Some studies have found that medical
students have more negative attitudes to disability than the general norm, whereas others trace
improvements during the course of medical education. Many courses of instruction medicalise
disability, fail to take a holistic view of health, and ignore the human rights of people with
disabilities. As a result, most students are sympathetic and display concern but have negative
views about the experience of living with disability.”).
45 See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. Their arguments in this regard draw from
and overlap with those of feminist critics of the privacy or choice framework. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93–102 (1987);
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 1394, 1415–16 (2009).
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adults, such as poverty and unemployment.”46 One way we might “actually
reduce the odds of disability-based abortions” then, is to expand services and
protections for people with disabilities in the world.47 “Guaranteeing mean-
ingful choices,” Ziegler contends, “inevitably involves the removal of the dis-
crimination and tangible obstacles that make abortion more common in
cases of fetal defect or disability.”48 She thus argues that reproductive justice
requires expansion of work supports for disabled people, the elimination of
work disincentives in the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supple-
mental Security Income programs, and “an effort to continue to remove the
stigma that discourages employers from hiring disabled adults and decreases
the odds that parents will bring a pregnancy to term in cases of disability.”49
People considering whether to have a disabled child might not be look-
ing so far into the future, though. They might be concerned with whether
they will receive the supports necessary to help their children flourish. The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) has, since 1975, prom-
ised children with disabilities a free appropriate public education in the least
restrictive environment.50 But Congress has never appropriated funds that
would come close to fully funding the federal government’s share of the cost
of implementing that law.51 The IDEA’s effectiveness has also been limited
by other policy developments—notably the rise of charter schools, where
disability rights compliance is uncertain at best.52 And Medicaid, which pro-
vides key services for many disabled children, is constantly at risk of cuts.53
46 Ziegler, supra note 1, at 589. For a discussion of the policy gaps that remove supports
for disabled individuals just as they reach adulthood, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Disability
Cliff, DEMOCRACY, Winter 2015, at 55. Dov Fox and Christopher Griffin find that the birth
rates of babies with Down syndrome significantly decreased after adoption of the ADA, and
they hypothesize that “the ADA paradoxically might have promoted disability-selective abor-
tion if social interactions reinforced negative attitudes toward people with disabilities or if the
media portrayed people with disabilities as incurring undesirable costs for society.” Dov Fox &
Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
2009 UTAH L. REV. 845, 893 (2009).
47 Ziegler, supra note 1, at 589.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 627–30.
50 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1487 (2012).
51 See Kim Dancy, Fully Funding IDEA: A Democratic Dream or Just an Empty Promise?,
NEW AMERICA (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/
fully-funding-idea/ [https://perma.cc/HAU9-MK45] (noting that the law specifies that the
federal government will pay for forty percent of the costs of the IDEA, but that it in fact pays
for about sixteen percent).
52 See Deborah Pergament, What Does Choice Really Mean?: Prenatal Testing, Disability,
and Special Education Without Illusions, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 55, 115 (2013) (arguing that
“access to public education services is dependent on a parent’s ability to navigate the increas-
ingly fragmented system of public resources or reliance on the private resources of family and
marketplace, if available,” that “[a]ccess to private resources may also require the willingness to
waive meaningful legal protections under the IDEA and other civil rights statutes,” and that
this is a crucial context for women’s decisions about whether to continue a pregnancy after
prenatal testing identifies a defect).
53 See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Medicaid Standoff: Trump Plan to Tighten Oversight of
States Draws Objections, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/medicaid-
standoff-trump-plan-to-tighten-oversight-of-states-draws-objections-11581771601 [https://
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Entrenching full funding for the IDEA and for the services and supports
provided to children with disabilities by Medicaid would be consistent with a
reproductive justice approach. So would efforts to ensure paid family leave,
respite services, and other supports for the caregivers of disabled children.54
Those sorts of societal and policy interventions would help to change
the broader context in which individuals make decisions about disability-
selective abortions. But, as we have seen, disability rights critics of prenatal
testing have focused as well on a different aspect of the context of these
decisions—alleged misinformation and coercion by medical professionals.55
It would be consistent with both a reproductive justice and a disability rights
approach to respond directly to that misinformation and coercion by ensur-
ing that individuals receive accurate information about life with a disability.56
Elizabeth Emens, for example, proposes that “prospective parents awaiting
prenatal testing results could be given access to resources on living with a
disability or with a disabled child, in terms of the experience of disability, or
the changes in the laws and resources available to people with relevant disa-
bilities.”57 These resources might include “[i]nformational video or audio re-
cordings,” “[a]ccess to engaging movies and literature related to relevant
disabilities, or the recent flourishing in disability arts,” and “resources for
connecting with and learning from families with children with relevant disa-
bilities, as well as adults with those disabilities.”58 Seema Mohapatra suggests
a similar effort to educate individuals who are pregnant with fetuses that
might be affected by the Zika virus.59
Laws in a number of states encourage medical professionals to provide
pregnant women with information that might counteract negative stereo-
types about fetal and childhood disability.60 For example, a Pennsylvania law
requires doctors who diagnose a fetus with Down syndrome to provide the
pregnant woman with information about the positive life prospects of people
with that condition, as well as connections to support services.61 Some repro-
perma.cc/26JH-AXQA] (“The Trump administration has previously invited states to change
the open-ended funding of Medicaid to limited block grants for some enrollees. A just-re-
leased White House budget proposal would cut Medicaid spending by about $920 billion over
the next decade. Plans are also under way to increase oversight of how states verify that enroll-
ees in the program are eligible for the services.”).
54 See Pasquale Toscano & Alexis Doyle, Legal Abortion Isn’t the Problem to be Solved,
ATLANTIC (June 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/selective-
abortion-bans-treat-disability-tragedy/592000/ [https://perma.cc/A9LV-SNMN].
55 See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
56 See Mohapatra, supra note 20, at 362 (arguing that “[l]egislation of this nature can build
bridges between reproductive rights and disability rights in the medical counseling arena”); see
generally Rachel Rebouché & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prenatal
Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L.J. 983, 1014 (2012) (“The response to the confusion
or anxiety resulting from testing, now and with future advances, is to call for clear and full
communication of evidence-based information to patients.”).
57 Emens, supra note 36, at 1417.
58 Id.
59 See Mohapatra, supra note 20, at 365–66.
60 See id. at 360–63.
61 See id. at 360–61.
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ductive justice advocates might object to these sorts of efforts. Deborah Per-
gament, for example, argues that, without a significant increase in the public
commitment to provide services to disabled children, these efforts “may ac-
tually present an unrealistic and unattainable—or even coercive—picture of
the choice to parent a child with a disability.”62 Arthur Caplan argues that
requiring genetic counselors to provide “deliberately positive” information
about life with a disability will “overturn[ ] the long-standing foundational
ethical norm of genetic testing and counseling—neutrality in the provision
of information.”63
And, of course, outside of the disability context “informed consent” re-
quirements for abortion often are imposed precisely because they place ob-
stacles in the way of women having abortions—and their advocates often
justify them as an effort to overcome social coercion that leads to “unwanted”
abortions.64 Abortion rights advocates are therefore justifiably wary of open-
ing the door to endorsing them. Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin,
for example, argue that “[t]he state must adopt a position of neutrality” and
“may not involve itself in the choice of whether or not to have an abortion,”
for doing so “den[ies] a woman the right to make an autonomous decision.”65
They argue that “informed consent” requirements violate this principle of
neutrality.66
But there is no neutral here. If medical professionals and prospective
parents have an unduly negative understanding of life with a disability,
driven by widespread societal stereotypes, then their decisions will be driven
by bias unless the state steps in to counteract those stereotypes. The pro-
“neutrality” argument rests on a public/private distinction of the type that
has been criticized by feminist fellow-travelers of the reproductive justice
movement.67 Once we accept that private as well as governmental pressures
can be coercive, we face the “classic Legal Realist problem” that the principle
of free choice alone cannot tell us what sorts of regulation are permissible.68
The “reproductive justice approach,” which encourages an affirmative
government role “in ensuring that all women have the social, political, and
economic power and resources to make the best decisions for themselves and
their families,”69 might well lead one to support carefully tailored informed
62 Pergament, supra note 52, at 84.
63 Arthur L. Caplan, Chloe’s Law: A Powerful Legislative Movement Challenging a Core
Ethical Norm of Genetic Testing, 13 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 3 (2015).
64 For a good discussion, see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1712–33 (2008).
65 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 1189, 1242 (2017).
66 See id. at 1245–46.
67 See West, supra note 45, at 1415–16.
68 Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 426.
69 Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, Editorial, The Paradox of Disability in Abortion De-
bates: Bringing the Pro-Choice and Disability Rights Communities Together, 84 CONTRACEP-
TION 541, 542 (2011).
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choice requirements here to overcome inaccurate societal stereotypes.
Sujatha Jesudason and Julia Epstein, for example, argue:
In the context of a prenatal diagnosis of disability, [reproductive
justice] means ensuring that women have the most accurate and
comprehensive information possible, including realistic perspec-
tives from individuals with the disability in question. A woman in
this situation requires access to abortion services in a timely man-
ner if she decides to terminate her pregnancy, and the supports
necessary to sustain her family if she decides to carry the pregnancy
to term.70
Jesudason and Epstein’s position is persuasive—at least where the in-
formation requirements are tailored to ensure that they do not impose a par-
ticular burden on a woman’s ultimate choice.71 In line with the general
reproductive justice approach, Jesudason and Epstein consider the choice to
have an abortion in a broader social and policy context. They focus on ensur-
ing that pregnant individuals have accurate information in making the
choice, and on ensuring full social supports for whatever choice is made. In
the end, though, they leave the choice whether to terminate a pregnancy
with the woman. They thus come to a very different conclusion on that
question than does Justice Thomas.
Most, though not all, disability rights advocates seem to agree with that
position.72 If selective abortion has such negative consequences for disabled
people, though, why don’t they seek to ban the practice?73 One answer looks
to a core principle articulated by participants in the disability rights move-
ment.74 One of the key targets of that movement was the paternalistic con-
trol of disabled people’s bodies by nondisabled people.75 Reproduction was
often—and continues to be—a key site of that paternalistic control.76 Just as
“regulating Black women’s reproductive decisions has been a central aspect
of racial oppression in America,”77 regulating disabled people’s reproductive
decisions has been a central aspect of disability oppression in America. And
that has led many disability rights activists to take a strongly pro-choice
70 Id.
71 Elizabeth Emens suggests, for example, that everyone who undergoes prenatal testing
should receive information about living with a disability before they receive their test results. See
Emens, supra note 36, at 1416–17. Because that information would be provided well before an
individual sought an abortion, it would not place any particular obstacle in the way of exercis-
ing the choice.
72 See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 441 n.85.
73 Cf. John F. Muller, Disability, Ambivalence, and the Law, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 488
(2011) (noting this seeming incongruity and suggesting that it reflects a broader ambivalence
toward disability).
74 For a good expression of the argument, see Rebecca Cokley, The Anti-Abortion Bill You
Aren’t Hearing About, REWIRE NEWS (May 20, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://rewire.news/article/
2019/05/20/the-anti-abortion-bill-you-arent-hearing-about/ [https://perma.cc/B4BM-
AXSK].
75 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 83–102 and accompanying text.
77 ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 6.
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stance. For them, a law seeking to deny women the right to make their own
reproductive choices—even with full information—feels disturbingly similar
to the laws and practices that have sought to deny disabled people the right
to make their own reproductive choices.78 Just as many reproductive justice
advocates “acknowledge the justice of ensuring equal access to birth control
for poor and minority women without denying the injustice of imposing
birth control as a means of reducing their fertility,”79 many disability rights
advocates strongly defend a woman’s ultimate right to choose without deny-
ing the ways in which those choices have sometimes been exercised unjustly.
Consistent with their position, and that of many reproductive justice
activists, I contend that changing the context in which potential parents
make reproductive choices is a far better approach than denying them the
power to choose in the final instance. In part, that is because it is possible to
intervene to counteract disablist stereotypes while ensuring that women re-
tain the power to choose. In part, that is because prohibitions of selective
abortion would authorize the penal authorities to examine a woman’s reasons
for choosing abortion in virtually every case, which would impose a massive
chilling effect on the exercise of the abortion right.80
Of course, this position will not satisfy those who oppose abortion—or
disability-selective abortion—in every case. But if one takes seriously the
anti-paternalistic principles articulated by both the disability rights and the
reproductive justice movements, one should be very wary of a position that
denies the ultimate choice to pregnant women. A position that creates a fair
context for making choices is far preferable. Justice Thomas is thus correct to
be concerned about selective abortion, but he is wrong to support a ban as a
remedy. A ban will broadly harm women’s autonomy, without changing the
context that devalues people with disabilities and encourages discrimination
in a variety of settings.
III. THE DOE QUESTION: DISABLED PARENTS
In his Box concurrence, Justice Thomas invoked the history of eugenics
to justify a law prohibiting selective abortion. But the eugenic practices he
invoked—including forced sterilization, the denial of the right to marry, and
compulsory abortions for disabled parents81—are much better exemplified by
the policy then-Judge Kavanaugh upheld in the Doe case. Recall that the Doe
policy denied people with developmental disabilities the right to make
choices about their medical care; under that policy, two of the plaintiffs were
78 See Cokley, supra note 74.
79 ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 56–57.
80 See Fox & Griffin, supra note 46, at 894 (arguing that “attempts to criminalize disabil-
ity-selective abortion could authorize easily abused inquiries into the legitimate reasons that
women have for seeking abortions”).
81 See Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing forced sterilization and the denial of the right to marry);
id. at 1789 (discussing forced abortion).
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forced to have abortions.82 Eugenic Era practices were similarly carried out
by violently denying the reproductive rights of disabled people. The legacy of
those practices remains today—with too little legal recourse available, and
too little public attention afforded to the issue. As I argue in this part, any
consideration of disability and reproductive rights must consider people with
disabilities as parents, not just as fetuses. In doing so, we must recognize the
legacy of eugenics in the treatment of parents and potential parents with
disabilities, applying reproductive justice and disability rights principles to
rectify that harmful legacy.
As Robyn Powell recently wrote, the eugenic impulse has been instanti-
ated in different ways over time—beginning with “[f]orced sterilizations”
during the Eugenics Era; then, as “compulsory sterilizations lessened,”
morphing into “restrictions on marriage”; and now often being “manifested
through discriminatory child welfare practices that presume unfitness.”83 But
the constant has been a refusal to treat disabled individuals as proper
parents.84
Most legal readers are familiar with the forced sterilization laws of the
eugenics period. The Supreme Court legitimated those laws in its infamous
Buck v. Bell85 decision in 1927. Buck upheld a Virginia sterilization law.86
Justice Holmes’s brief opinion for the Court fully endorsed the Eugenics
Era’s harmful stereotypes about people with mental disabilities: that they
“sap the strength of the State;”87 that they might not even be able to perceive
the harm caused them by being sterilized;88 and that allowing disabled peo-
ple to reproduce would lead to society “being swamped with incompe-
82 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
83 Robyn M. Powell, Safeguarding the Rights of Parents with Intellectual Disabilities in
Child Welfare Cases: The Convergence of Social Science and Law, 20 CUNY L. REV. 127, 130
(2016); see also Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termina-
tion of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 387, 387–88 (2000) (“Gone are the days when the ‘mentally disabled’ or mentally
retarded were mandatorily sterilized as a condition of deinstitutionalization because it was
believed ‘three generations of imbeciles [were] enough.’ However, the underlying belief that
persons with mental disabilities should not reproduce and are inherently unable to provide
proper parenting to their children survives today.” (footnote omitted)).
84 Although it is different in some details, the story of efforts to control the reproductive
choices of disabled people thus parallels (and is in significant ways intertwined with) the story
Dorothy Roberts tells about efforts to control the reproductive choices of Black women. See,
e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 6 (arguing that “regulating Black women’s reproductive deci-
sions had been a central aspect of racial oppression in America”); see also infra note 92.
85 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
86 For the classic investigation into the collusive nature of the litigation, which concludes
that Carrie Buck did not have a mental disability, see Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations,
No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985).
87 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
88 See id. (describing being sterilized as “lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned”).
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tence.”89 Holmes’s concluding sentences are among the most infamous in the
United States Reports90:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degen-
erate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough.91
As Mary Dudziak notes, “through his uncritical embrace of eugenic policy,
Holmes gave a shaky eugenics movement a strong stamp of legitimacy.”92
Scholars have estimated that states relied on Eugenics Era laws to ster-
ilize more than 65,000 people, often based on their supposed “feebleminded-
ness.”93 Official state sterilization programs continued long after one might
think. North Carolina’s program, for example, extended to 1974.94 And
these programs imposed harms that were not based on disability alone but
that struck at the intersection between disability and race. Particularly in the
South, a disproportionate number of the sterilized individuals were Black
persons who had been diagnosed with mental disabilities.95
89 Id.
90 See Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. Bell, and the History of Equal Protection,
90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 106 (2005) (describing Buck as Holmes’s “most despised opinion and
one of the most reviled decisions in the entire Supreme Court canon” (footnote omitted)).
91 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted).
92 Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing
of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833, 836 (1986) (footnote omitted).
93 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE
RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 15 (2012) (“The Supreme
Court endorsed the legislative trend toward forced sterilization; as a result of these state stat-
utes, by 1970 more than 65,000 Americans had been involuntarily sterilized.”).
94 See KEVIN BEGOS ET AL., AGAINST THEIR WILL: NORTH CAROLINA’S STERILIZA-
TION PROGRAM AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REPARATIONS iii (2012) (North Carolina’s sterili-
zation program continued into the 1970s); Alfred L. Brophy & Elizabeth Troutman, The
Eugenics Movement in North Carolina, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1871, 1877 (2016) (“Between 1929
and 1974, North Carolina authorized the sterilization of nearly 7,600 people under the state’s
1929 sterilization law and subsequent North Carolina Eugenics Board program.”). For an ex-
ample from a neighboring state, see Genevieve Carlton, Virginia Ran a Secret Eugenics Program
That Didn’t End Until 1979, MEDIUM (Apr. 18, 2018) https://medium.com/@editors_91459/
virginia-ran-a-secret-eugenics-program-that-didnt-end-until-1979-e9fcbfd23c64 [https://per
ma.cc/7CRH-C8XF].
95 See ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 89–90 (“The demise of Jim Crow had ironically opened
the doors of state institutions to Blacks, who took the place of poor whites as the main target
of the eugenicist’s scalpel. South Carolina reported in 1955, for example, that all of the twenty-
three persons sterilized at the State Hospital over the previous year were Black women. The
North Carolina Eugenics Commission sterilized nearly 8,000 ‘mentally deficient persons’ in
the 1930s and 1940s, some 5,000 of whom were Black.” (footnote omitted)); see also Maya
Manian, Coerced Sterilization of Mexican-American Women: The Story of Madrigal v. Quilligan,
in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 97, 99 (Melissa Murray et al. eds., 2019)
(describing coerced sterilization of Mexican-American women in California into the 1970s).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\14-2\HLP201.txt unknown Seq: 17 20-OCT-20 13:27
2020] Disability and Reproductive Justice 289
It would be a mistake to think that the practice of involuntary steriliza-
tion of disabled people ended in the 1970s, though.96 In 2001, the Eighth
Circuit, citing Buck, said that involuntary sterilization of “the mentally hand-
icapped” could be constitutional if appropriate procedural protections were
provided.97 Following a remand for a trial, the court upheld a decision find-
ing no constitutional violation where a woman with developmental disabili-
ties agreed to undergo sterilization in order to convince a child services
caseworker to return her already-born children to her custody.98 A 2012 re-
port by the National Council on Disability found that eleven states contin-
ued to have laws on the books that authorize involuntary sterilization for
people with “hereditary forms of ‘idiocy’ and ‘imbecility,’ ” or that use similar
formulations.99
And as a matter of informal practice, people with some disabilities—
particularly intellectual disabilities—continue to be routinely sterilized with-
out their making a meaningful choice. The National Council on Disability
found that “there appears to be a growing trend nationally and internation-
ally toward sterilizing people with intellectual or psychiatric disabilities.”100
Often, as in the case of the so-called “Ashley Treatment,” the sterilization
occurs with the consent of a disabled person’s parent—though not of the
disabled person herself.101 If the parents and doctors are all on board, these
sorts of sterilization decisions can easily fly under the radar and evade mech-
anisms of legal accountability.102
96 See Powell, supra note 83, at 133 (“Strikingly, although not as popular as previously,
coercive sterilization of people with intellectual disabilities persists. Moreover, several states
still restrict people with disabilities, mostly intellectual or psychiatric disabilities, from mar-
rying.” (footnote omitted)).
97 Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001). The court unfortunately did not
specify what procedural protections would be necessary or sufficient. See id. at 1129 n.3 (“Be-
cause no procedural protections were given, we need not decide what minimum procedures are
required by the Due Process Clause.”).
98 See Vaughn v. Ruoff, 304 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2002).
99 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 93, at 40.
100 Id.
101 See generally Julia Epstein & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Revisiting Ashley X: An Essay on
Disabled Bodily Integrity, Sexuality, Dignity, and Family Caregiving, 35 TOURO L. REV. 197
(2019); Mary Koll, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic Growth Attenuation, Parental Medical
Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally Disabled Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 225 (2010).
102 See, e.g., Alicia R. Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of
Disabled Children: Lessons from the Ashley X Case, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 207, 221
(2008) (“Parental decisions to consent to medical interventions for their children are subject to
very few legal restrictions. Even a review by a hospital ethics committee is not legally required,
and the recommendations of such a committee are non-binding. The vast discretion given to
parents is rooted in their constitutional right to oversee the upbringing of their children.”);
Patricia J. Williams, Babies, Bodies and Buyers, 33 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 11, 21–22 (2016)
(arguing that “[i]n essence, the hospital allowed ethical questions about Ashley’s long-term
care and comfort to be privatized by deferring so unquestioningly to her parents’ posited love”
and noting that “much of the debate about Ashley’s treatment since 2006 has tended to leave
the decision to parental determination of risk-benefit analysis, and to dismiss regulatory over-
sight as some kind of invasion of privacy”). Even in the eugenic programs of the past, many
acts of sterilization were based on purported “consent”—which was likely often coerced, and
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But even when disabled people can conceive and bear children, they
face substantial discrimination in the child welfare system.103 There are indi-
cations that child protective services investigations are initiated against dis-
abled parents at a higher rate than against nondisabled parents.104 Parents
with disabilities lose custody of their children at higher rates as well.105 As
one analysis summarized the cases, “[f]requently, the only basis for removal
is the parent’s disability and a baseless speculative concern that the parent
will not be able to provide practically, developmentally, or in some other way
for the child.”106
Once the child of a disabled parent is in the child welfare system, the
parent will often face further discrimination. Although the law requires that
the state provide reunification services before terminating an individual’s pa-
rental rights, parents with disabilities often do not receive these services or
do not receive services that are appropriate to their needs.107 Laws authoriz-
ing termination of parental rights (TPR) often explicitly list disability as a
ground for termination.108 And judges adjudicating TPR cases often rule
based on their own negative preconceived notions about the ability of dis-
abled people to parent.109 Three decades ago, Robert Hayman aptly de-
scribed the persistent discrimination against parents with disabilities in
termination proceedings as a modern-day legacy of Buck v. Bell.110
which provided a means of avoiding judicial scrutiny. See Brophy & Troutman, supra note 94,
at 1930 (describing North Carolina’s experience).
103 See, e.g., Robyn M. Powell, Family Law, Parents with Disabilities, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 57 FAM. CT. REV. 37, 38 (2019) (arguing that “parents with diverse
disabilities—including intellectual and developmental disabilities, psychiatric disabilities, phys-
ical disabilities, and sensory disabilities— . . . contend with substantial and persistent bias
within the family law system, often threatening their custody and visitation rights”); Charisa
Smith, Unfit Through Unfairness: The Termination of Parental Rights Due to a Parent’s Mental
Challenges, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 377, 399–401 (2014) (describing discrimination against
parents with mental disabilities in the child welfare system).
104 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 93, at 79–84; Powell, supra note 103,
at 39 (stating that “parents with disabilities are more likely to be referred to the child welfare
system than nondisabled parents”).
105 For some statistics, see Ella Callow et al., Parents with Disabilities in the United States:
Prevalence, Perspectives, and a Proposal for Legislative Change to Protect the Right to Family in the
Disability Community, 17 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 9, 15 (2011) (“Statistics collected by indepen-
dent organizations indicate that based on the disability population, removal ranges from
40–60% for parents with developmental disabilities to as high as 70–80% for those with psy-
chiatric disabilities. Statistics on removal rates for parents with physical or sensory disabilities
are not as readily available, though these communities report significantly heightened rates of
removal. In one study of 1,000 predominantly physically disabled parents, 15% reported exper-
iencing pathological, discriminatory treatment related to custody litigation.” (footnotes
omitted)).
106 Id. at 10.
107 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 93, at 88–93; Kerr, supra note 83, at
403; Powell, supra note 83, at 137.
108 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 93, at 84 (“Currently, 36 states list
psychiatric disabilities, 32 list intellectual or developmental disability, 18 list ‘emotional illness,’
and 7 list physical disabilities as grounds for TPR.”).
109 See Powell, supra note 83, at 139–40.
110 See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Re-
tarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203 (1990) (“Each mentally retarded parent faces
the substantial likelihood that, by legal prescription, she will soon no longer be. The class of
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Many state courts have refused to apply disability antidiscrimination
principles to the termination of parental rights process. They have reached
this conclusion through two paths. Some courts have held that the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) simply does not apply to TPR proceed-
ings.111 Such a holding seems to conflict with both the text of the ADA,
which indicates that it applies to anything a state government entity does,112
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
v. Yeskey,113 which gave the statute a reach as broad as its plain text.114 Other
courts have held that the ADA cannot be raised as a defense in those pro-
ceedings, but must be asserted by the disabled parent earlier, such as when
reunification services are being (or should be) provided.115 But many disabled
parents in the child welfare system—parents who are often poor and unso-
phisticated—are not able to assert these rights in a timely fashion and ac-
cordingly lose them.116
Disability rights and reproductive justice perspectives overlap when
considering this discrimination against disabled parents and potential par-
ents. All of these practices, from sterilization, to denial of custody, to termi-
nation of parental rights, rest on a paternalistic understanding of people with
disabilities as incompetent—in conflict with basic principles of disability
rights. That understanding is a false one. People with a range of both physi-
cal and mental disabilities can be successful parents with appropriate sup-
ports.117 And it is the very discriminatory acts of child welfare officials and
others that deny disabled parents the reunification services and other sup-
ports they need.118
Even if the courts took acts of discrimination against parents and po-
tential parents with disabilities more seriously, it would be difficult for the
mentally retarded parents, meanwhile, drifts toward a eugenicist vision: due in large part to the
systematic termination of their parental rights—one of the law’s more vulgar fictions—and in
small part to some strategic definitional retreats, utter extinction of the class is not altogether
improbable. Three generations must have been enough after all; the law has said as much.”
(citations omitted)).
111 See Charisa Smith, Making Good on an Historic Federal Precedent: Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) Claims and the Termination of Parental Rights of Parents with Mental Disabil-
ities, 18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 191, 223 (2015) (noting that “a majority of courts have
found that TPR proceedings are not considered ‘services, programs, or activities’ under the
ADA, and thus preclude an ADA defense” (citations omitted)).
112 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
113 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
114 See id. at 211–12.
115 See Smith, supra note 111, at 224 (“In certain other cases, courts have denied
an ADA defense to TPR simply because the matter was not raised in earlier proceedings, and
should have been raised by parents’ attorneys sooner—possibly when a service plan was cre-
ated, or soon after that time.”).
116 See id.
117 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 93, at 185–227; Smith, supra note
103, at 387–89.
118 See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
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victims of discrimination to challenge those acts. Many of the relevant acts
take place below the radar—in the practices of state probate courts, obscure
and unaccountable state bureaucracies, isolated medical professionals, and
even in the actions of disabled individuals’ own parents and guardians. The
affected disabled individuals often are disempowered and cut off from effec-
tive access to legal counsel. Individual enforcement of the disability rights
laws is thus unlikely to solve the problem.
Because of the barriers to individual enforcement by disabled parents,
the government must take an active role in vindicating the principles of non-
discrimination and accommodation that appear in the ADA. During the
Obama Administration, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) took some steps in that direc-
tion. DOJ and HHS conducted a joint investigation of the Massachusetts
Department of Children and Families, and they found that the state agency
had violated the rights of a mother with a developmental disability by re-
moving her child from her custody two days after birth and then failing to
provide her supports and services.119 The two federal departments followed
that action by issuing guidance to all states’ child welfare agencies regarding
the protections the disability discrimination laws afford to parents with disa-
bilities.120 That is the sort of effort that is necessary to take seriously the
reproductive rights of disabled parents. The federal government should make
an aggressive effort to educate judges and participants in the health care and
child welfare systems about the possibility of accommodating disabled par-
ents, and it should aggressively investigate, sue, and threaten to cut off fund-
ing from those entities that do not heed the mandate against discrimination.
CONCLUSION
When questions of disability come up in discussions of reproductive
rights, they are often raised by those who, like Justice Thomas, seek to raise
the specter of selective abortion to challenge abortion rights generally. In this
Article, I have argued that the focus on selective abortion misses crucial as-
pects of the problem—and that the solution of banning selective abortion is
misguided. The true descendants of the Eugenics Era practices Justice
Thomas decried in his Box concurrence are not selective abortions, but the
legal and societal decisions to deny reproductive rights to disabled people—
decisions instantiated, for example, in the statute then-Judge Kavanaugh up-
held in Doe. Any true effort to promote reproductive justice for people with
disabilities must address those practices.
119 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROTECT-
ING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND PROSPECTIVE PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES: TECHNI-
CAL ASSISTANCE FOR STATE AND LOCAL CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES AND COURTS
UNDER TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT (2015), https://www.ada.gov/doj_hhs_ta/child_welfare_ta.html
[https://perma.cc/92KR-2VQK].
120 See id.
